



The Scope of Tribal Immunity in 
Real Property Disputes 
Sean Frazzette† 
Native American tribes are sovereign nations with some degree of sovereign 
immunity. The exact contours of that immunity are often in flux. While the Supreme 
Court has established the confines of tribal immunity in cases involving torts, taxa-
tion, and contracts, it has avoided determining the doctrine’s application to cases 
involving real property. Recently, in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v Lundgren, the 
Court dismissed the common notion that prior precedent mandates an in rem versus 
in personam distinction but refused to answer whether tribes can claim sovereign 
immunity in in rem actions against tribal land. By analyzing the history of tribal 
sovereignty, land ownership, and immunity from suit, this Comment argues that 
absent explicit congressional action, tribes can claim sovereign immunity in suits 
involving any form of tribal property. Only tribes themselves and the legislative 
branch of the federal government have the constitutional authority to alter these 
contours. 
The dissent in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe introduced a relevant legal concern: 
the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity. But an analogy to the his-
torical treatment of foreign nations quickly disposes of this concern. The concurrence 
proposed a policy concern: the potential for sovereign immunity to be used as a sword 
rather than a shield. This concern is readily refuted, however. The history of sover-
eign immunity in the United States, especially with regard to foreign nations and 
Native tribes—as well as the best interest of the tribes—side with broad immunity 
from suit. Under this Comment’s expansive approach to tribal immunity, Congress 
maintains its role as the sole political branch that may adjust tribal immunity, 
and—more importantly—tribes maintain the right to determine their own sover-
eignty and invoke their own immunity, protecting land that the government has so 
consistently taken from them throughout this country’s history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign states have long been immune from suit. Although 
sovereign immunity in its various forms has occasionally been 
maligned as “beyond the pale”1 or even unconstitutional,2 the doc-
trine has (so far) survived the test of time.3 But different sover-
eigns have different immunities. Under US law, foreign nation 
immunity, state immunity, and territorial immunity are each 
varied in scope and have developed in different manners.4 More-
over, Native tribes are not foreign countries, states, or territories; 
rather, courts most frequently view them as “domestic dependent 
nations.”5 What this title means for both their sovereignty and 
their immunity from suit has been ever evolving. Over the years, 
 
 1 Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 831–32 (2014) (Ginsburg 
dissenting) (arguing that both tribal and state sovereign immunity have become “immod-
erate” and will prove to lack “staying power”). 
 2 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan L Rev 1201, 1203–
16 (2001) (explaining that there is no constitutional justification for any form of sovereign 
immunity and arguing it may in fact be unconstitutional under several theories, including 
originalism). 
 3 See, for example, Franchise Tax Board of California v Hyatt, 139 S Ct 1485, 1499 
(2019) (“[T]he States’ sovereign immunity is a historically rooted principle embedded in 
the text and structure of the Constitution.”); Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 785 
(“[A]bsent [congressional] abrogation (or a waiver), Indian tribes have immunity even 
when a suit arises from off-reservation commercial activity.”). 
 4 See, for example, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 94-583, 90 
Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended in various sections of Title 28 (codifying foreign na-
tion immunity with limited exceptions); Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 11–14 (1890) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that states have maintained immunity 
from suit); Porto Rico v Rosaly y Castillo, 227 US 270, 274 (1913) (noting that “the incor-
porated Territories have always been held to possess an immunity from suit”). 
 5 Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17 (1831); Bay Mills Indian Commu-
nity, 572 US at 788. 
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the Supreme Court has established the confines of tribal immun-
ity in cases involving torts,6 taxation,7 and contracts;8 however, it 
has avoided determining the doctrine’s application to cases in-
volving real property. For two decades, some courts applied a mis-
guided interpretation of County of Yakima v Confederated Tribes 
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation9 to limit tribal immunity 
to in personam cases but not in rem cases.10 Other courts rejected 
County of Yakima’s applicability and found tribal immunity ap-
plied in both types of cases.11 When the Supreme Court finally 
confronted the question in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v 
Lundgren,12 Justice Neil Gorsuch confirmed that County of Ya-
kima should not be interpreted as the law governing real property 
disputes, but then deemed that to be “work enough for the day.”13 
Instead of a new rule, he offered only a truism: “Determining the 
 
 6 See Lewis v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1289 (2017) (“That an employee was acting 
within the scope of his employment at the time the tort was committed is not, on its own, 
sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.”). 
 7 See Oklahoma Tax Commission v Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla-
homa, 498 US 505, 507 (1991) (“We conclude that under the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity, the State may not tax such sales to Indians, but remains free to collect taxes 
on sales to nonmembers of the tribe.”). 
 8 See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 760 
(1998) (“Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve 
governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reserva-
tion. Congress has not abrogated this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the im-
munity governs this case.”). 
 9 502 US 251 (1992). 
 10 County of Yakima interpreted the General Allotment Act of 1887, Pub L No 49-
119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified as amended at 25 USC § 331 et seq, as allowing “an ad 
valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee pursuant to the Act, but [not allowing] the 
county to enforce its excise tax on sales of such land.” County of Yakima, 502 US at 270. 
The Court centered its holding on a textualist analysis of the General Allotment Act, which 
permits “‘taxation of . . . land,’ not ‘taxation with respect to land,’ ‘taxation of transactions 
involving land,’ or ‘taxation based on the value of land.’” County of Yakima, 502 US at 269 
(alteration in original); see also generally General Allotment Act, 24 Stat 388. Given both 
the narrow holding of the case and the majority’s strict reading of the Act’s text, it would 
not be prudent to expand County of Yakima beyond the distinction of taxing fee land 
within reservations versus taxing the sale of that land. 
 11 Compare Cass County Joint Water Resource District v 1.43 Acres of Land in High-
land Township, 643 NW2d 685, 691–94 (ND 2002) (citing County of Yakima, then holding 
that “the State may exercise territorial jurisdiction over the land, including an in rem 
condemnation action, and the Tribe’s sovereign immunity is not implicated”), with Ha-
maatsa, Inc v Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P3d 977, 985 (NM 2016) (determining that “in the 
context of tribal sovereign immunity there exists no meaningful distinction between in 
rem and in personam claims”). 
 12 138 S Ct 1649 (2018). 
 13 Id at 1652, 1655. 
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limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave 
question.”14 
Due to tribes’ unique and ambiguous status as domestic de-
pendent nations, courts and scholars often focus on comparing 
tribes to other forms of sovereigns.15 Some form of sovereign im-
munity applies to any state—whether a foreign nation, one of the 
several states, or an Indian tribe—that exercises sovereignty. 
Moreover, the doctrine is generally a common law doctrine, with 
exceptions like the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act16 (FSIA). 
Accordingly, determining its applicability is an exercise in track-
ing case law. Thus, the ways in which courts have dealt with for-
eign nations, states, and territories should shed some light on 
how they should deal with tribes in the future. 
Justice Gorsuch was not wrong to call the question grave. The 
history of tribal land in the United States is one of theft.17 In 1823, 
the Supreme Court held that the United States maintained “the 
exclusive right of extinguishing the title” of Native land.18 In the 
1880s, when the United States began allotting reservation land 
to individual Natives, tribal landholdings were around 140 mil-
lion acres;19 50 years later, that number was around 50 million 
acres.20 By the 1930s, when the government repudiated allotment, 
around 27 million acres had been transferred to non-Native own-
ership.21 Today, more than 56.2 million acres of Native land exist, 
 
 14 Id at 1654. 
 15 See, for example, Gregory Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors in Indian Law, 80 Mont 
L Rev 11, 12 (2019) (“[T]he status of Native nations within federal law has almost always 
been defined with reference to other sovereigns.”). See also id at 12–20 (explaining the com-
parisons to foreign nations); id at 20–27 (same to states); id at 27–39 (same to territories). 
 16 Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended in various sections of 
Title 28. 
 17 See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 
Harv L Rev 1787, 1796–97 (2019) (“From the Founding, the national government has had 
a direct hand in the violent dispossession of Native peoples, the internment of Natives into 
reservation camps, and efforts to ‘kill the Indian and save the man’ by forcing Indian chil-
dren into boarding schools run by the federal government.”). 
 18 Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 588 (1823). 
 19 Allotment was a government practice aimed at forcing assimilation and ending 
Native sovereignty. The federal government granted land to individual tribe members to 
be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years, after which it would be con-
verted to a fee simple title, and the landholders would be granted US citizenship. The 
policy was eventually altered to allow the secretary of the interior to issue the fee patent 
at any time. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz St L J 1, 10–12 (1995). 
 20 Marc Slonim, Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of History 
in Indian Law, 45 Gonzaga L Rev 517, 522 (2009). 
 21 Royster, 27 Ariz St L J at 12 (cited in note 19). In 1934, Congress passed the Indian 
Reorganization Act, Pub L No 73-383, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq, which 
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all of which are held in trust by the United States.22 As Justice 
Gorsuch noted, the scope of tribal immunity in cases involving 
real property “will affect all tribes, not just the one before us.”23 A 
poorly thought-out rule could only exacerbate the dispossession of 
land held by Native Americans. 
This Comment argues that Native tribes, absent congres-
sional waiver, should be able to claim immunity to suit in any in 
rem actions involving real property.24 Unless Congress acts, tribal 
immunity will remain at its peak. And although the Court voiced 
two major concerns with tribal immunity in this context, both can 
be resolved within this existing legal framework. To this end, this 
Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity and its various limits. To understand tribal 
immunity, one must first understand the origins and scope of sov-
ereign immunity more broadly. Part II then focuses on the law 
surrounding tribal land, tribal sovereignty, and tribal immunity, 
culminating in the undecided question presented in Upper Skagit 
Indian Tribe: May tribes claim sovereign immunity in suits in-
volving their real property? Part III answers this question. While 
advocating for nearly unlimited tribal immunity might appear 
somewhat radical, this solution provides the protection necessary 
to maintain tribal land and avoids the legal and practical issues 
suggested by the Court. Additionally, an expansive view of in rem 
immunity is more consistent with the general principles of tribal 
immunity. The Conclusion summarizes the contributions of this 
 
prohibited further allotment, extended trust relationships indefinitely, and authorized the 
secretary of the interior to take new land into trust and add land to reservations. Royster, 
27 Ariz St L J at 17 (cited in note 19). 
 22 This was the estimated amount at the time of publication. See Frequently Asked 
Questions (US Department of the Interior, Indian Affairs), archived at 
https://perma.cc/H3G4-ZLMN. Recently, in McGirt v Oklahoma, 2020 WL 3848063 (US), 
the Supreme Court confirmed that a portion of Oklahoma—which had not been treated 
like a reservation for decades—has actually remained one. See id at *22 (“The federal 
government promised the Creek a reservation in perpetuity. . . . Congress has never with-
drawn the promised reservation.”). This decision should add approximately nineteen mil-
lion acres to this total. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Toe Hard Line in 
Affirming Reservation Status for Eastern Oklahoma (SCOTUSblog, July 9, 2020), archived 
at https://perma.cc/G5NF-AL3P. 
 23 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1654. 
 24 In rem actions are those directly against property and enforceable against the 
world, while in personam actions are against another person and enforceable only against 
that person. The former can be against any form of property, but this Comment focuses 
only on those against real property, such as adverse-possession and quiet-title claims. See 
Henry Campbell Black, Treatise of the Law of Judgments Including the Doctrine of Res 
Judicata § 792 (West 1891). 
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Comment and addresses its future implications as tribes contin-
ually attempt to repossess their land. 
I.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: DOCTRINE AND LIMITATIONS 
While the in rem immunity question left unanswered in Up-
per Skagit Indian Tribe is the impetus for this Comment, a thor-
ough understanding of sovereign immunity is necessary to come 
to a satisfying solution.25 The doctrine has its origins in the com-
mon law. Limitations to its scope could therefore come from the 
government altering the law by statute26 or by a judge-made ex-
ception. For the purposes of this Comment, the most relevant ex-
ample of a judge-made rule is the immovable property exception, 
which holds that any immovable property—that is, real property 
and any structures attached thereto—is not subject to sovereign 
immunity when it is acquired within another sovereign. It is this 
exception that Justice Clarence Thomas cites in his Upper Skagit 
Indian Tribe dissent as the clear answer to the question of tribal 
immunity’s scope as applied to real property.27 
But to answer the question posed by the Upper Skagit Indian 
Tribe majority, the applicability of the immovable property excep-
tion to tribes is “more complicated than [Justice Thomas] prom-
ises,”28 and the government has not clarified the scope of tribal 
immunity by statute. A brief overview of the case law developing 
sovereign immunity is therefore useful. Although it remains a le-
gally distinct doctrine, tribal immunity shares common principles 
with other forms of sovereign immunity. Consequently, 
 
 25 There are two ways to conceptualize sovereign immunity. One could consider 
whether a sovereign is incapable of being haled into its own courts, or one could consider 
whether a sovereign could be brought into another sovereign’s courts. Kiowa Tribe of Ok-
lahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 760–61 (1998) (Stevens dissent-
ing). An individual tribe’s domestic law determines a tribal court’s jurisdiction, while US 
law determines the immunity it affords other sovereigns in federal court. See id. Individ-
ual tribes can and do handle their jurisdictional scope differently. See Catherine T. Struve, 
Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 Ariz St L J 137, 155–61 (2004). Due to both the 
tribes’ greater authority in their own courts and the potentially vast differences in rules, 
this Comment only confronts the jurisdiction of US federal and state courts. 
 26 A common example is waiver, which is when the government limits its own im-
munity. See, for example, Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 2674 (“The United States 
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall 
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”). 
 27 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1657 (Thomas dissenting). 
 28 Id at 1654 (majority). 
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understanding the doctrine’s development on the whole is benefi-
cial to understanding its scope for tribes. 
This Part proceeds in two steps. First, it explains how the 
various sovereigns recognized by the United States are granted 
immunity. Second, it discusses how the immovable property ex-
ception has been applied to these sovereigns. 
A. Sources of Sovereign Immunity 
The Constitution establishes the federal government and 
acknowledges the existence of four additional potential sover-
eigns. The Commerce Clause names “foreign Nations, . . . the sev-
eral States, and [ ] the Indian Tribes,”29 and Article IV discusses 
territories.30 Part II of this Comment will address the sovereignty 
of Native tribes, but this Part describes the immunities of the 
other four cognizable sovereigns. Tribal immunity, while distinct 
in its boundaries and history, shares some key features with these 
other forms of immunity. 
The precise origins of federal sovereign immunity are up for 
debate. The system likely began in England due to the intricacies 
of the feudal justice system before eventually being repurposed as 
an extension of the divine right of kings.31 William Blackstone 
promulgated the latter theory, and the phrase “the king can do no 
wrong” was born.32 Even though the United States has an express 
ban on granting titles of nobility,33 many presumed that the US 
government maintained immunity upon its independence.34 In-
deed, when pressed on the issue, the Court has found a “univer-
sally received opinion [ ] that no suit can be commenced or 
 
 29 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3. 
 30 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States.”). The very language of Article IV suggests that territories are not their 
own sovereigns, and the Supreme Court has adopted that interpretation. See Puerto Rico 
v Sanchez Valle, 136 S Ct 1863, 1876 (2016) (holding that “the Commonwealth and the 
United States are not separate sovereigns”). Nevertheless, the territories do enjoy some 
immunity from suit. See note 4 and text accompanying notes 54–59. 
 31 George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 
La L Rev 476, 477–79 (1953). 
 32 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 238–41  
(Oxford 1765–1769). 
 33 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 8. 
 34 See Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 541, 548 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob 
E. Cooke, ed) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit 
of an individual without its consent.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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prosecuted against the United States.”35 The Court has never of-
fered a compelling reason for sovereign immunity’s durability in 
a country without a feudal system or an infallible monarch, but 
rather admits to the puzzle: “[T]he principle has never been dis-
cussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated 
as an established doctrine.”36 
State immunity was not as clear at the time of the Founding. 
During the debates over the ratification of the Constitution, Alex-
ander Hamilton assured the public that immunity “is now enjoyed 
by the government of every state in the union,”37 but others were 
not so certain. Some feared that the Constitution created only one 
sovereign—the federal government—and that the Constitution 
may even have explicitly permitted suits against states.38 Arti-
cle III of the Constitution directly references controversies “be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State.”39 While one possible 
interpretation of this clause permitted jurisdiction only when a 
state consents,40 the Court decided otherwise in Chisholm v Geor-
gia.41 This led to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, 
which has been interpreted as confirming the existence of state 
immunity against suits by residents of other states. But it did not 
create state immunity.42 Rather, it merely clarified that “the 
 
 35 Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 411–12 (1821). 
 36 United States v Lee, 106 US (16 Otto) 196, 207 (1882). But see Nevada v Hall, 440 
US 410, 415 (1979) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Franchise Tax Board 
of California v Hyatt, 139 S Ct 1485 (2019): 
The King’s immunity rested primarily on the structure of the feudal system and 
secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no wrong. 
We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists when they 
declared their independence from the Crown. 
 37 Federalist 81, in The Federalist at 549 (cited in note 34). 
 38 Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
Harv L Rev 1559, 1581 (2002). 
 39 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1. 
 40 Nelson, 115 Harv L Rev at 1587 (cited in note 38). 
 41 2 US (2 Dall) 419, 461 (1793) (finding “nothing against, but much in favour of, the 
jurisdiction of this Court over the State of Georgia”) (emphasis omitted). 
 42 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 11 (1890) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] did not in 
terms prohibit suits by individuals against the States, but declared that the Constitution 
should not be construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.”). The 
exact meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is a contentious topic in legal academia. Some 
say it merely overruled Chisholm; others say it applies only to cases involving diversity 
jurisdiction; and still others support the Court’s continuous extratextual expansion of 
Eleventh Amendment protections to cases involving admiralty and suits brought by for-
eign nations and Native tribes. For a brief summary of these competing ideas, see David 
A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv L Rev 1, 50–
52 (2015). This Comment does not offer an independent analysis of the Eleventh 
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States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sover-
eignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Con-
stitution, and which they retain today.”43 State immunity is not 
absolute, however—even when the state itself has refused con-
sent to be sued. For example, the Court has made clear that Con-
gress may abrogate state immunity when enacting legislation for 
the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Additionally, 
for forty years, courts allowed for private suits against states in 
different states’ courts.45 Such nonconsensual suits, however, 
have recently been deemed unconstitutional.46 
Before the FSIA, foreign nation immunity was a common law 
doctrine centered around deference to the executive branch. The 
common law came from customary international law, which 
stated that a sovereign could not be haled into another sovereign’s 
court, and was recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall early 
in this country’s history: “A foreign sovereign is not understood as 
intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with 
his dignity, and the dignity of his nation.”47 Even if framed as tra-
ditional common law, foreign nation immunity was clearly a mat-
ter of comity from the US government, specifically the executive 
branch.48 That is, the president and secretary of state would de-
termine if diplomatic negotiation was preferable to litigation, and 
courts, rather than assuming jurisdiction, would defer to their 
judgment.49 The FSIA was passed in 1976 to remove the discre-
tionary application of sovereign immunity.50 The FSIA confirmed 
that, “[s]ubject to existing international agreements” made before 
 
Amendment. Instead, it accepts the Court’s recent rationale that the amendment did not 
create state immunity, but merely confirmed preconstitutional ideas of the doctrine and 
overruled Chisholm. 
 43 Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 713 (1999). 
 44 Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976). See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v 
Florida, 517 US 44, 59 (1996). 
 45 See Hall, 440 US at 426–27 (holding that state immunity in other states may be 
“wise policy” if provided voluntarily by states, but, if imposed by a federal court as a con-
stitutional matter, “would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States—
and the power of the people—in our Union”). 
 46 Franchise Tax Board, 139 S Ct at 1499 (holding that “historical evidence show[s] 
a widespread preratification understanding that States retained immunity from private 
suits, both in their own courts and in other courts”). 
 47 The Schooner Exchange v M’Faddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
 48 See Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (1983). 
 49 See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 US 578, 586–87 (1943). 
 50 See Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 488 (noting that the FSIA was passed, among other 
things, to avoid “case-by-case diplomatic pressures” and ensure litigants were receiving 
due process). 
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the time of the passing of the act, foreign nations were not subject 
to the jurisdiction of US courts.51 There are specific exceptions 
made to the general rule, the most relevant of which are if the 
foreign nation waives the immunity52 or if “rights in immovable 
property situated in the United States are in issue.”53 
Lastly, territories have retained common law immunity from 
suit. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, the source of 
the immunity is “not because of any formal conception or obsolete 
theory” but rather the doctrine comes from “the logical and prac-
tical ground that there can be no legal right as against the au-
thority that makes the law on which the right depends.”54 Fur-
thermore, a territory has the ability to “waive its exemption” if 
desired, just like any other sovereign.55 But Justice Holmes did 
not stop there. He gave a full-throated endorsement of sovereign 
immunity even for partial sovereigns because they “originate and 
change at their will the law of contract and property,” which is 
where their citizens “derive their rights.”56 He made clear that 
“Congress might intervene, just as in the case of a State the Con-
stitution does,” but regardless “the rights that exist are not cre-
ated by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of cer-
tain limitations of power.”57 Thus, Congress has plenary power 
over the territories, and the territories lack sovereignty “in the 
full sense.”58 But despite this, territorial immunity still remains 
at its strongest, unless Congress intervenes.59 
B. The Immovable Property Exception 
When unencumbered by a statutory provision, immunity 
from suit is subject only to the judge-made exceptions that have 
 
 51 28 USC § 1604. 
 52 See 28 USC § 1605(a)(1). 
 53 28 USC § 1605(a)(4). 
 54 Kawananakoa v Polyblank, 205 US 349, 353 (1907). This holding only makes sense 
when a state is sued in its own courts. See, for example, Hall, 440 US at 416 (noting that 
Justice Holmes’s “explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may 
be sued in its own courts without its consent,” but when a state is haled into another 
sovereign’s court, the immunity “must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, 
between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dig-
nity of the first as a matter of comity”). 
 55 Kawananakoa, 205 US at 353. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id at 353–54. 
 58 Id at 353. 
 59 Kawananakoa, 205 US at 353. 
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developed through the common law. The most notable of these for 
the purposes of this Comment is the immovable property excep-
tion. The exception itself, which Justice Thomas called “hornbook 
law almost as long as there have been hornbooks,”60 was quaintly 
invoked by scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek: “Even if we 
should refrain from the arrest of a prince on account of the invio-
lability of his person, who could say that the property of a prince 
in a foreign country is equally inviolable?”61 Simply stated, im-
movable property acquired by a sovereign, but located within a 
different sovereign, is not immune from suit. Rather, it is to be 
treated the same as any other private property located within a 
sovereign’s jurisdiction. This is because “property ownership is 
not an inherently sovereign function”—instead, it is a private 
function.62 But the history of the immovable property exception’s 
application in US law is not so straightforward. 
In the 1812 case The Schooner Exchange v M’Faddon,63 the 
Court recognized the immovable property exception in its very 
first acknowledgment of foreign state immunity: “A prince, by ac-
quiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be con-
sidered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction[;] 
he may be considered as so far laying down the prince, and as-
suming the character of a private individual.”64 It now remains 
alive and well as applied to foreign state immunity, having been 
codified in the FSIA as follows: “A foreign state shall not be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the 
States in any case . . . in which . . . rights in immovable property 
situated in the United States are in issue.”65 But despite the dicta 
in The Schooner Exchange, courts never actually invoked the im-
movable property exception against a foreign state.66 Instead, the 
 
 60 Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1657 (Thomas dissenting). 
 61 Cornelius van Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis: A Monograph 
on the Jurisdiction over Ambassadors in Both Civil and Criminal Cases 22 (Oxford 1946) 
(originally published 1721). 
 62 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193, 
199–200 (2007). 
 63 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 64 Id at 145. 
 65 28 USC § 1605(a) (emphasis added). 
 66 Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, 
Meaning and Effect, 3 Yale J Intl L 1, 33 (1976) (“No . . . judicial denial of immunity ap-
pears to have been expressly based on [immovable property] grounds.”). Given that Con-
gress passed the FSIA in 1976, Fredric Alan Weber’s article should reflect comprehensive 
research on the immovable property exception before the codification of foreign nation 
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scope of foreign state immunity depended on the executive 
branch. Ordinarily, the State Department “requested immunity 
in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns,” until 1952 
when the secretary of state determined private actions by foreign 
parties should not always be barred.67 Even after this determina-
tion, “[o]n occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of 
immunity in cases where immunity would not have been availa-
ble” if the immovable property exception applied.68 If the foreign 
nation had not engaged with the State Department in a given 
suit, then courts would make decisions with deference to any prior 
negotiations by the State Department.69 This occasionally created 
inconsistent rulings, which caused Congress to intervene and 
pass the FSIA.70 Historically, therefore, the rule was not that 
suits over immovable property were permitted, but rather that 
the State Department provided an ad hoc determination of the 
scope of a foreign nation’s immunity. 
In contrast, courts have unequivocally adopted the exception 
within state sovereignty. In Georgia v City of Chattanooga,71 the 
state of Georgia owned a railroad within Tennessee and sought to 
enjoin the city of Chattanooga from appropriating some of the 
land.72 The Court rejected Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity 
over the land because the state “acquired land in another State 
for the purpose of using it in a private capacity.”73 The justifica-
tion for denying state sovereign immunity was that the “terms on 
which Tennessee gave Georgia permission to acquire and use the 
 
immunity. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v Lundgren, 
No 17-387, *8 (US filed Mar 12, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 1326147). 
 67 Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 486–87 (emphasis added). With the codification of the 
exception, however, the Court has altered its range. For example, it was found to apply in 
tax liens against the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations because a tax lien 
implicates a “quintessential right[ ] of property ownership” and is therefore within the 
immovable property exception without being an action against the property itself. Perma-
nent Mission of India to the United Nations, 551 US at 198–99. Consequently, the excep-
tion is understood to now apply whenever the property rights are at issue, even if the 
property itself is not directly implicated. But see Fagot Rodriguez v Republic of Costa Rica, 
297 F3d 1, 11 (1st Cir 2002) (“[P]urely compensatory rights, without more, are insufficient 
to sustain jurisdiction under the immovable property exception.”). Nevertheless, these ex-
pansions all occurred after the passage of the FSIA, and thus are not contextually relevant 
for this Comment. 
 68 Verlinden B.V., 461 US at 487. 
 69 Id at 487–88. 
 70 Id at 488. 
 71 264 US 472 (1924). 
 72 Id at 478. 
 73 Id at 479–80. 
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land” constituted Georgia’s implicit consent to be susceptible to 
condemnation proceedings.74 
The doctrine does not appear to have ever been applied to ter-
ritorial immunity, nor, as will be seen, tribal immunity. 
Theoretically, the immovable property exception is straight-
forward: sovereigns acquire property as if they are private per-
sons. Nevertheless, its place in US law is much muddier. While a 
state cannot acquire land within another state and claim immun-
ity, a foreign nation, until the passage of the FSIA, very often 
could have. The exception may be found in a hornbook, but its 
application is varied, and may for some sovereigns only be found 
within policy memoranda at the State Department. 
The developments of the above forms of immunity are each 
distinct in some manner from tribal immunity, and, accordingly, 
the corresponding applicability of the immovable property excep-
tion is in question. But these concepts are nevertheless related 
and will inform the discussion of tribal sovereignty and immunity 
below. 
II.  TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND IMMUNITY 
What does this all mean for tribes? They “are subject to ple-
nary control by Congress,” but as domestic dependent nations, 
tribes retain whatever sovereignty they do possess until Congress 
exercises its plenary control to the contrary.75 The strength of that 
sovereignty has historically been in flux, but this Comment con-
tends that it has gradually grown stronger over time. One scholar 
has argued that, by basing this fluctuation on the uniqueness of 
tribal sovereignty (as opposed to other forms of sovereignty), the 
Court “has provided a powerful and ongoing ideological tool in 
constructing U.S. colonialism over Native peoples.”76 Recently, 
however, the Court has seemed more inclined to recognize tribes’ 
sovereignty.77 Does this potential pivot solidify a specific type of 
sovereign lens with which we should view tribes? And with the 
form of sovereignty comes the question of what sort of immunity 
from suit the tribes maintain. The courts have expanded and 
 
 74 Id at 480. 
 75 Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 788 (2014). 
 76 Ablavsky, 80 Mont L Rev at 12 (cited in note 15). 
 77 See Herrera v Wyoming, 139 S Ct 1686, 1699 (2019) (observing that any “treaty is 
‘essentially a contract between two sovereign nations’”), quoting Washington v Washing-
ton State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 US 658, 675 (1979). 
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contracted both tribal sovereignty and the corresponding immun-
ity over the years, resulting in a lack of clarity as to whether they 
may claim that immunity in in rem actions involving real prop-
erty. 
This Part seeks to clarify the fluctuations. Justice Anthony 
Kennedy has said tribal immunity has “developed almost by acci-
dent”78 and “with little analysis.”79 Others have argued that the 
doctrine is coherent as an “intentional byproduct of relationships 
negotiated across centuries between the United States and the 
. . . Indian nations.”80 This Comment argues that the actual origin 
matters much less than the current status. Individual cases may 
twist or turn, but the historical path has proceeded toward treat-
ing tribes as fully recognized sovereigns, unless Congress uses its 
plenary power. 
First, this Part explains the origins of tribal sovereignty and 
notes where it stands today. Second, it establishes how tribes hold 
land. Because this Comment’s purpose is to determine when 
tribes may claim immunity from suits involving real property, a 
broader understanding of what that real property looks like is 
necessary. Third, it addresses tribes’ ability to regain sovereignty 
over dispossessed land. Fourth, it explains the development of 
tribal immunity, focusing on the larger trend of expansion. Fifth, 
it recognizes the split that led to the Court’s hearing of Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe. Finally, it offers an overview of the legal and 
policy concerns raised in that case. 
This Part seeks to meld the doctrines related to tribal sover-
eignty, the development of tribal immunity, the history of tribal 
land classifications, and the historical treatment of tribes to con-
textualize the proposed rule: tribal immunity should be unlimited 
in real property disputes unless Congress acts. 
A. The Current State of Tribal Sovereignty 
Although much of federal Indian law seems subject to the 
whims of whichever justices may be on the bench, one can discern 
some basic rules of tribal sovereignty. The government’s view of 
tribal sovereignty has mostly fluctuated between recognition of 
tribal independence and autonomy and reactionary 
 
 78 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc, 523 US 751, 756 (1998). 
 79 Id at 757. 
 80 William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 
Am U L Rev 1587, 1594 (2013). 
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condemnation of these same principles. Over time, however, the 
reactionary efforts have been quieted by clearer legal recognitions 
of sovereignty. 
In 1831 and 1832, Chief Justice Marshall penned the two 
opinions—Cherokee Nation v Georgia81 and Worcester v Geor-
gia82—that have arguably had the greatest impact on how courts 
conceptualize tribal sovereignty. The former established the foun-
dation for treating tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” 
likening tribes’ relationship to the United States to that of a 
“ward to his guardian,” and ruled that the tribes “occupy a terri-
tory to which [the United States] assert[s] a title independent of 
their will.”83 The Court disparagingly held that tribes are “so com-
pletely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, 
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political con-
nexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of 
our territory, and an act of hostility.”84 The language is quite 
damning for tribal sovereignty, but the Court walked back some 
of it the following year in Worcester. After hearing a case regard-
ing the constitutionality of a state statute criminalizing a non-
Native person’s being on tribal land, Chief Justice Marshall ruled 
that “Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, in-
dependent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time 
 
 81 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831). 
 82 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832). 
 83 Cherokee Nation, 30 US at 17. 
 84 Id at 17–18. Justice Smith Thompson dissented, arguing that tribes were a foreign 
nation with “absolute sovereignty and self government” of their land. Id at 53 (Thompson 
dissenting). Had he won the day, the question of tribal immunity for cases involving real 
property may be much easier. Consider the following from Justice Thompson’s dissent: 
The Cherokee territory being within the chartered limits of Georgia, does not 
affect the question. When Georgia is spoken of as a state, reference is had to its 
political character, and not to boundary; and it is not perceived that any absurd-
ity or inconsistency grows out of the circumstance, that the jurisdiction and ter-
ritory of the state of Georgia surround or extend on every side of the Cherokee 
territory. It may be inconvenient to the state, and very desirable, that the Cher-
okees should be removed; but it does not at all affect the political relation be-
tween Georgia and those Indians. . . . If we look to lexicographers, as well as 
approved writers, for the use of the term foreign, it may be applied with the 
strictest propriety to the Cherokee nation. 
Id at 55–56. If true, then the immovable property in question is not private property within 
another sovereign, but rather a sovereign within another sovereign, and thus retains im-
munity from suit. 
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immemorial.”85 The Court recognized the tribe as “a distinct com-
munity occupying its own territory, with boundaries” that pre-
cluded Georgia law from applying to those within the reserva-
tion.86 The title of domestic dependent nation was far from 
abrogated, but the Court did grant clearer, partial sovereignty to 
the tribes.87 
For over one hundred years, the Court engaged in a struggle 
between stripping sovereignty through various means and re-
turning some autonomy to the tribes.88 Eventually, however, the 
Court began to embrace the concept of tribal sovereignty. Nota-
bly, the cases of the twentieth century were often rooted in anal-
ogies to state and foreign nation immunity. In one case, the Court 
ruled that preventing the tribes from prosecuting “infractions of 
tribal law would detract substantially from tribal self-govern-
ment, just as federal pre-emption of state criminal jurisdiction 
 
 85 Worcester, 31 US at 559. The notion from Worcester that state sovereignty ends at 
reservation borders has since been abrogated. See Nevada v Hicks, 533 US 353, 361–62 (2001). 
 86 Worcester, 31 US at 561. 
 87 There is a compelling legal history argument that Chief Justice Marshall actually 
wanted to vindicate Cherokee rights all along. He dismissed Cherokee Nation on jurisdic-
tional grounds, but he both hinted in his decision that a different case could result in vic-
tory for the tribe and also encouraged dissents. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A 
Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan L Rev 500, 516 (1969). But his decision in 
Worcester was not because of the sovereignty, laws, and rights of the Cherokee people; 
rather, it was because the laws of Georgia were “repugnant to the [C]onstitution, laws, 
and treaties of the United States.” Worcester, 31 US at 561. That is, while it may be true 
Chief Justice Marshall respected Native sovereignty, he mostly sought to preserve federal 
authority. 
 88 This Comment focuses on the current status of tribal sovereignty. The path to the 
current doctrine is fraught with examples of governmental derogation of tribes. After Chief 
Justice Marshall died, the Court acted at times as if tribes had never been sovereign. See, 
for example, United States v Rogers, 45 US (4 How) 567, 572 (1846) (“The native tribes 
who were found on this continent at the time of its discovery have never been acknowl-
edged or treated as independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded as 
the owners of the territories they respectively occupied.”). Meanwhile, the other branches 
of the federal government actively sought to destroy tribal sovereignty through both sei-
zure of property and pressure to deed land to the government. Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at 
1637–38 (cited in note 80). During this period, the government committed to allotment, 
before eventually retreating and trying to expand tribal sovereignty in the 1930s and 
1940s. See text accompanying notes 110–12. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government re-
verted to antisovereignty policies and pursued a policy of termination. Through a series of 
laws and decrees, the government ended the sovereignty of several tribes, granted states 
rights over some tribal land, and forced tribe members to assimilate. See Michael C. 
Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 Stan L Rev 1181, 1184–86 
(1983). Congress has since repudiated anti-tribe policies and “committed to a policy of sup-
porting tribal self-government and self-determination.” National Farmers Union Insur-
ance Cos v Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 US 845, 856 (1985). 
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would trench upon important state interests.”89 In another, the 
Court required a “full record to be developed in the Tribal Court” 
before bringing a civil claim over which a tribe has jurisdiction in 
a federal court, enforcing a rule similar to the international legal 
standard of exhaustion.90 The Court even recognized a “funda-
mental attribute of sovereignty”—the right to tax transactions oc-
curring on trust lands—as “derive[d] from the tribe’s general au-
thority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its 
jurisdiction.”91 In addition, it reaffirmed that “a hallmark of In-
dian sovereignty is the power to exclude” non-Natives from that 
very jurisdiction.92 
Progress did not come without setbacks, but even these were 
contextualized with an emphasis on sovereignty. Tribes were 
found to lack “inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indi-
ans.”93 However, they were deemed able “to prosecute nonmember 
Indians” under their “inherent tribal authority.”94 Civil jurisdic-
tion could not extend to all non-Indians on fee land,95 but did ex-
tend to “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reser-
vation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe.”96 Although these cases never directly involved 
 
 89 United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 332 (1978). 
 90 National Farmers Union Insurance Cos, 471 US at 856. See also Stephen W. Yale-
Loehr, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and Forum Non Conveniens in Interna-
tional Litigation in U.S. Courts, 13 Cornell Intl L J 351, 357 (1980) (“The International 
Court of Justice has noted that ‘the rule that local remedies must be exhausted before 
international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary inter-
national law.’”) (quoting Interhandel Case (Switzerland v United States), 1959 ICJ 6, 27). 
 91 Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US 130, 137 (1982), citing Washington v 
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US 134, 152 (1980) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 92 Merrion, 455 US at 141. 
 93 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191, 212 (1978). 
 94 United States v Lara, 541 US 193, 210 (2004). One reading of Lara could be that 
the majority only ruled that Congress constitutionally authorized tribes to prosecute non-
member Natives. Id. The decision focused on interpreting a statute passed after Duro v 
Reina, 495 US 676 (1990), in which the Court had found there was no inherent authority 
to prosecute nonmember Natives. Id at 679. The statute in question, however, notes that 
“the inherent power of Indian tribes” is “recognized and affirmed.” 25 USC § 1301(2). The 
Lara majority, when confronted with whether Congress meant that the statutory power 
comes from “inherent tribal sovereignty” or “delegated federal authority,” ruled “that Con-
gress intended the former.” Lara, 541 US at 199 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 95 Fee land, or fee-patented land, is one of the three ways in which tribes hold land. 
It is usually formally allotted land after the trust period has expired, or land that a tribe 
has purchased but is not held in trust by the government. See notes 122–23. 
 96 Montana v United States, 450 US 544, 566 (1981). 
1622 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1605 
 
real property, they offer a glimpse into how the Court through the 
years viewed the nature of a domestic dependent nation. 
In recent years, the Court has reinforced the nature of Native 
tribes as full sovereigns until altered according “to the will of the 
Federal Government.”97 It considers the tribes as “remain[ing] 
‘separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution,’” who are en-
titled to “historic sovereign authority.”98 It is safe to say that even 
with the occasional setbacks,99 the Court seems determined to 
treat tribes like their own sovereigns, not too different than one 
of the several states or a foreign nation. Then again, differences 
still do exist. As long as Congress maintains plenary powers over 
the tribes, then the tribes can never be fully sovereign.100 
B. Tribal Land Classifications 
As seen with the immovable property exception above, much 
of the concern over immunity is whether the land in question is 
sovereign land or privately purchased land within another sover-
eign’s territory. Thus, with the state of tribal sovereignty estab-
lished, an understanding of the land that tribes possess is necessary. 
Southern states and Native tribes clashed during the early 
years of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Indian Re-
moval Act.101 The federal government proceeded to forcibly move 
tribal members from their southern lands to reservations west of 
the Mississippi.102 Eventually, however, the federal government 
came after these lands reserved for the Native tribes as well.103 
Beginning in the 1870s, Congress outlawed making treaties 
with tribes and officially ceased recognition of tribal independ-
ence.104 In 1887, Congress passed the Indian General Allotment 
 
 97 Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 803. 
 98 Id at 788, quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 56 (1978). 
 99 See, for example, Cass County v Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US 
103, 113–14 (1998) (holding reservation land that was alienated but then reacquired is 
now subject to state taxation); Carcieri v Salazar, 555 US 379, 394–95 (2009) (restricting 
the ability of the secretary of the interior to acquire land in trust for tribes to only the 
tribes existing at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act’s enactment). 
 100 For an analysis of this tension, see Lara, 541 US at 214–26 (Thomas concurring). 
 101 Pub L No 21-148, 4 Stat 411 (1830). 
 102 Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830–1976: The 
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the 
Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DePaul L Rev 911, 931–34 (2002). 
 103 Id at 934. 
 104 Id. 
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Act,105 which sought to grant reservation land to individual tribal 
members and “extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation 
boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the society 
at large.”106 The Act “empowered the President to allot most tribal 
lands nationwide without the consent of the Indian nations in-
volved.”107 The allotments were held in trust by the US govern-
ment for twenty-five years, and then issued to the holders as fee-
patented land.108 When the land was transferred to fee patent, the 
owners of the lot were deemed to have “the benefit of and be sub-
ject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory 
in which they may reside.”109 The policies of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were an acknowledgement that 
tribal sovereignty over these lands had existed and simultane-
ously an effort by the federal government to quash that sovereignty. 
Eventually, the United States reversed course. In 1906, Con-
gress statutorily perpetuated some tribal governments indefi-
nitely,110 and then, in 1934, ended allotment through the Indian 
Reorganization Act111 (IRA). The Act recognized the “inherent sov-
ereign power” of Native tribes (but limited its reference to docu-
ment adoption by the tribal governments) as well as ensured that 
the constitutions of the tribes were not deemed invalid by any 
other part of the statute.112 Most importantly, it extended the 
trust relationship period over allotted land indefinitely.113 This 
created checkerboard-like reservations,114 which had some lots of 
land owned by the tribe, some lots of Native-owned fee-patented 
land, some lots of allotted land held in trust by the federal gov-
ernment, and some lots of land owned by non-Natives.115 
 
 105 Pub L No 49-119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified as amended at 25 USC § 331 et seq. 
 106 County of Yakima, 502 US at 254. 
 107 Id. 
 108 25 USC § 348. 
 109 25 USC § 349. 
 110 Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at 1639 (cited in note 80). 
 111 Pub L No 73-383, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq. The purpose of the 
Act was “to restore ‘the principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance’ that 
prevailed before the General Allotment Act.” Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653, 
quoting County of Yakima, 502 US at 255. 
 112 25 USC § 476(h). 
 113 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653. 
 114 See John Collier, Office of Indian Affairs, 1934 Annual Report of the Commissioner 
of the Office of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior 78, 80 (1934) (“While Congress 
did not specifically direct the consolidation of Indian lands broken up and checkerboarded 
with white holdings in the allotment process, it authorized such consolidation and set up 
the machinery for it.”). 
 115 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1653. 
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The policies surrounding allotment and the IRA resulted in 
the solidification of the three forms of tribal land today: reserva-
tions, trust land, and fee patents.116 Each form of ownership is 
from a different type of acquisition and thus entail a different 
bundle of rights. 
The first two forms are referred to as “Indian Country,” which 
includes the land within a reservation, dependent Native commu-
nities within the United States, and any non-extinguished allot-
ments.117 Reservations are “geographically defined . . . areas over 
which an [Indian tribal organization] exercises governmental ju-
risdiction so long as such . . . areas are legally recognized by the 
Federal or a State government as being set aside for the use of 
Indians.”118 This land can be diminished if explicitly intended by 
an act of Congress, but otherwise its boundaries cannot be altered.119 
Trust land is land purchased by the secretary of the interior 
and then held in trust for the tribe, with the same legal exemp-
tions as the reservation land.120 This category refers to land out-
side of reservation boundaries, and thus should be distinguished 
from reservation land that is held in trust. The secretary has a 
number of factors to consider when a tribe asks to purchase land 
to hold in trust, including “the tribe’s need for additional land; 
‘[t]he purposes for which the land will be used’; ‘the impact on the 
State and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of 
 
 116 See Mary E. Saitta, Note, The Power to Tax Is the Power to Foreclose: Reuniting 
Law and Logic in Tribal Immunity from Suit, 60 Buff L Rev 225, 230–33 (2012) (explain-
ing the differences between reservation land, trust land, and fee-patented land). It should 
be noted that both trust land and fee patents can (and often do) exist within reservation 
boundaries. 
 117 18 USC § 1151. The dependent Native communities can be in “original or subse-
quently acquired territory.” 18 USC § 1151. 
 118 7 CFR § 253.2. 
 119 See Solem v Bartlett, 465 US 463, 470 (1984) (citations and alterations omitted): 
Our analysis . . . requires that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent to change 
boundaries’ before diminishment will be found. The most probative evidence of 
congressional intent is the statutory language used. . . . Explicit reference to ces-
sion or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal 
interests strongly suggests that Congress meant to divest from the reservation 
all unallotted opened lands. 
The Court has recently reinforced this view. See Nebraska v Parker, 136 S Ct 1072, 1078–
79 (2016) (explaining that diminishment analyses should “start with the statutory text,” 
then turn to “circumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation” and “‘unequivocal 
evidence’ of the contemporaneous and subsequent understanding of the status of the res-
ervation by members and nonmembers.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 120 25 USC § 465. 
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the land from the tax rolls’; and ‘[j]urisdictional problems and po-
tential conflicts of land use which may arise.’”121 
Finally, fee-patented land includes the formerly allotted land 
after the trust period has expired,122 as well as any land simply 
purchased privately by tribes.123 
Because of the federal government’s historically derogatory 
treatment of tribes and because the IRA did not address the is-
sues around dispossessed land, much of this historically tribal 
land is now outside of Native control. Many of the cases where 
sovereign immunity will be most questionable may be centered on 
various tribes’ buying back of land that was once their own. 
C. Regaining Sovereignty Through Aboriginal Title 
In rem disputes over real property will inevitably involve 
each of the above classifications of land. But the federal govern-
ment, through Indian removal and the diminishment of tribal 
property, took most of the land that tribes owned. This, in turn, 
has jeopardized the tribes’ claims of sovereignty. Three Supreme 
Court cases have addressed the potential ability to regain that 
sovereignty through the common law claim of aboriginal title.124 
In Oneida Indian Nation of New York v County of Oneida125 
(Oneida I), County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation of New York 
State126 (Oneida II), and City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation 
of New York,127 the Court determined that sovereignty need not 
be permanently lost due solely to the dispossession of land. At the 
same time, the Court introduced some restrictions that will need 
to be taken into account when determining whether tribes can 
retain sovereign immunity over all of their land. 
In Oneida I, the Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) brought a claim 
that land conveyed in various treaties in the 1700s was done so 
in violation of a number of statutes known collectively as the 
 
 121 City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 US 197, 221 (2005) (al-
terations in original), quoting 25 CFR § 151.10(f). 
 122 25 USC § 349. 
 123 See Saitta, 60 Buff L Rev at 232–33 (cited in note 116). 
 124 Aboriginal title is the common law doctrine that tribes maintain rights tradition-
ally associated with sovereignty even after colonial takings of land and arises from “the 
possessory rights of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands.” Oneida Indian Nation of New 
York v County of Oneida, 414 US 661, 667 (1974) (Oneida I). 
 125 414 US 661 (1974). 
 126 470 US 226 (1985). 
 127 544 US 197 (2005). 
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Nonintercourse Act.128 In its decision, the Court ruled that it has 
jurisdiction over the claim that “federal law now protects, and has 
continuously protected from the time of the formation of the 
United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from 
the application of state law principles which normally and sepa-
rately protect a valid right of possession.”129 A decade later, the 
OIN brought a second suit claiming damages for the unlawful 
conveyance of this land 175 years prior.130 The Court methodically 
worked through a very complex issue, eventually permitting fed-
eral common law actions for possessory rights.131 This meant that 
the OIN did not need a statutorily defined right for property ac-
tions, but rather could rely on the long history of the common law 
supporting such actions. 
The Court heard a third case involving the OIN twenty years 
later, which has had the greatest impact on regaining sover-
eignty. In City of Sherrill, the Court revisited the same land at 
issue in Oneida I and Oneida II but instead focused on the refusal 
to pay property taxes on the land by the tribe. In an 8–1 decision, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recounted the history of the land 
and the development of the aboriginal right to possessory 
claims.132 The Court addressed the current composition of the 
land: it was 99 percent non-Native, and the land had been sold to 
non-Natives in 1807.133 The boundaries of the land lay within the 
former reservation and thus the OIN argued that it maintained 
an immunity from taxation, and the Second Circuit agreed.134 The 
Supreme Court reversed, on what it saw as practical grounds: 
“This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek 
to revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court, 
and the attendant dramatic changes in the character of the prop-
erties, preclude [the] OIN from gaining the disruptive remedy it 
now seeks.”135 The Court made clear that its dismissal was only 
in regard to equitable relief, applying the common law doctrine of 
laches, or the unreasonable passage of time.136 
 
 128 Oneida I, 414 US at 664–65. The Nonintercourse Act, which forbids anyone but the 
federal government from purchasing lands from Natives, remains codified. See 25 USC § 177. 
 129 Oneida I, 414 US at 677. 
 130 Oneida II, 470 US at 229–30. 
 131 Id at 233–36. 
 132 See City of Sherrill, 544 US at 203–11. 
 133 Id at 211. 
 134 Id at 211–12. 
 135 Id at 216–17. 
 136 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 216–19. 
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Justice Ginsburg’s infamous analysis centers on what she 
considered practicality. She worried that “the unilateral reestab-
lishment of present and future Indian sovereign control, even 
over land purchased at the market price, would have disruptive 
practical consequences.”137 In his concurrence, Justice David 
Souter echoed these practical concerns, noting that “sovereign 
status” is not only ascertained through “background law” but also 
“the Tribe’s behavior over a long period of time.”138 While these 
Justices framed their decisions as common sense, or even obvious, 
many members of Native tribes have justifiably criticized the 
opinion as “complicit in the denial of treaty-guaranteed property 
rights, the denigration of tribal sovereignty, and the subordina-
tion of Oneida rights to the demands of the dominant society.”139 
Having decided that the tribe “cannot unilaterally revive its 
ancient sovereignty,”140 the Court recognized in dicta that 25 USC 
§ 465 offered the exact remedy that the tribes were looking for: 
revitalization, in trust, of previously tribal land and exemption 
from taxation.141 Justice Ginsburg suggested application for trust 
status is “the proper avenue for [the] OIN to reestablish sovereign 
authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.”142 
This may have established a presumption that tribes do not have 
any sovereignty over these lands until Congress or the secretary 
of the interior regrants it, meaning that these lands would likely 
be deprived of immunity from suit as well. Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, however, remained unconvinced, believing that the Court 
violated the principles that only Congress may “diminish or dis-
establish a tribe’s reservation” and that a “tribe enjoys immunity 
from state and local taxation of its reservation lands, until that 
immunity is explicitly revoked by Congress.”143 
City of Sherrill, while technically about remedies, contained 
larger implications for sovereignty and immunity. Without sover-
eignty, there can be no immunity. If Justice Ginsburg’s logic—
that tribal sovereignty cannot be revived under certain 
 
 137 Id at 219. 
 138 Id at 222 (Souter concurring). 
 139 Allison M. Dussias, The Reports of Our Death Are Greatly Exaggerated—Reflec-
tions on the Resilience of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 2018 BYU L Rev 1231, 
1275 (2019). 
 140 City of Sherrill, 544 US at 203. 
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 143 Id at 224 (Stevens dissenting). 
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circumstances and after a certain amount of time—is extended to 
prohibit the revival of sovereignty for lands dispossessed in less 
extreme ways and for shorter amounts of time, then tribes’ claims 
of immunity may be fruitless. Oneida II provides some hope for 
tribes to retain sovereignty long after they lost their land; a viable 
solution to the scope of tribal immunity in real property suits 
must reconcile this hope with the implications in City of Sherrill. 
D. Development of Tribal Immunity 
When not extinguished or expired, tribal sovereignty has gen-
erally moved away from the initial ward-guardian relationship 
toward an expansive right, and so too has tribal immunity. The 
first potential glimpse of tribal immunity emerged in 1850, when 
the Taney Court ruled that the Cherokees were “in many respects 
a foreign and independent nation” and “governed by their own 
laws and officers.”144 While the Court never explicitly mentioned 
sovereign immunity, it did note that “a public officer, acting for 
his government” cannot be sued for his actions.145 
The Court did not address tribal immunity for nearly another 
seventy years. In Turner v United States,146 Justice Louis 
Brandeis recognized that the Creek Nation “exercised within a 
defined territory the powers of a sovereign people.”147 He then 
ruled, however, that it was “not the immunity of a sovereign to 
suit, but the lack of a substantive right to recover the damages 
resulting from failure of a government or its officers to keep the 
peace” that caused there to be no possible avenue for liability 
against the tribe.148 Thus, while it may be a mistake to call Turner 
the foundation of tribal immunity, it has become “a slender reed 
for supporting the principle.”149 The Court, citing Turner, finally 
did give a full-throated backing to tribal immunity in 1940: 
 
 144 Parks v Ross, 52 US (11 How) 362, 374 (1850). This case was decided only four 
years after the decision discussed above in Rogers, see note 88, emphasizing the fickle 
nature of the government’s treatment of tribal sovereignty. 
 145 Parks, 52 US (11 How) at 374. 
 146 248 US 354 (1919). 
 147 Id at 355. 
 148 Id at 358. He also ruled the US Government had “not impose[d] any liability upon 
the Creek Nation” and, because the US Government was an indispensable party, “objected 
also to the jurisdiction of the court over it.” Id at 358–59. In this regard, there were many 
more issues than possible common law tribal immunity at play. 
 149 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 757. 
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The public policy which exempted the dependent as well as 
the dominant sovereignties from suit without consent. contin-
ues this immunity even after dissolution of the tribal govern-
ment. These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without 
Congressional authorization. It is as though the immunity 
which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the United States 
for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.150 
This was the Supreme Court’s broadest decision on tribal im-
munity to date and would remain the only decision for almost 
forty years.151 First, the case established tribal sovereignty as a 
fundamental aspect of the trustor-trustee relationship that the 
US government had created with the tribes.152 Second, the Court 
extended tribal immunity even to tribes whose governments had 
dissolved. This observation calls into question Justice Ginsburg’s 
dicta in City of Sherrill that likens a loss of sovereignty to a loss 
of land. Considering both a government and land are fundamen-
tal aspects of sovereignty, it could follow that if losing government 
alone is not enough to lose sovereignty, then neither is losing 
land.153 
From then on, the Court acted as if tribal immunity were a 
given. It cited only three cases—Turner, United States v United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co,154 and Puyallup Tribe, Inc v De-
partment of Game of Washington155—to claim that “Indian tribes 
have long been recognized as possessing the common-law 
 
 150 United States v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US 506, 512 (1940) 
(citations omitted). The Court also cited an Eighth Circuit case, which appears to be the 
first published record of tribal immunity. See Thebo v Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F 372, 
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 151 See Wood, 62 Am U L Rev at 1653–54 (cited in note 80). 
 152 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US at 512. 
 153 Of course, obvious counterarguments emerge. First, the OIN was absent from the 
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immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”156 
In this regard, Justice Kennedy appears correct when he says the 
doctrine is almost accidental and lacking in analysis. But the 
origin (or lack thereof) of the doctrine has not stopped its growth. 
Tribal immunity has held steady, encompassing any situation 
where the tribe is the “real party in interest.”157 
With this continuous affirmation and occasional growth, 
tribal immunity is now certainly the law of the land. Indeed, the 
Court can safely now say “an Indian tribe is subject to suit only 
where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived 
its immunity.”158 Through its plenary powers, Congress can limit 
or abrogate any form of sovereign immunity at any time, and even 
has done so for some forms of tribal immunity in a limited man-
ner.159 More often, however, Congress has “reiterated its approval 
of the immunity doctrine.”160 
Furthermore, the Court has developed its justification for 
this deferential attitude over the years. “[T]ribal self-sufficiency 
and economic development” has left the Court “not disposed to 
modify the long-established principle.”161 Justice Kennedy cri-
tiqued this rationale and noted “reasons to doubt the wisdom of 
perpetuating the doctrine,” which “might suggest a need to abro-
gate tribal immunity,” but still voiced the Court’s deference “to 
the role [of] Congress.”162 In doing so, the Court found “instructive 
the problems of sovereign immunity for foreign countries” be-
cause it “began as a judicial doctrine” like tribal immunity and 
extended to “virtually absolute immunity” until Congress created 
“more predictable and precise rules.”163 
The Court did not make a definite endorsement of treating 
tribes the same as foreign nations. But one could infer from the 
 
 156 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58. 
 157 See Lewis v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1289 (2017) (holding an employee of a tribe 
acting in the scope of his employment is not immune from suit because he, “not the tribe, 
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 158 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 US at 754. 
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offenses committed by or against Natives in Indian territory located in Alaska, California, 
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Court’s language that absent explicit congressional notice, tribal 
immunity can at least be considered similar to the foreign state 
immunity prior to the FSIA. In turn, such an analogy would mean 
the immovable property doctrine’s applicability is entirely up in 
the air. This is because before the FSIA, the applicability of the 
immovable property exception was entirely determined by execu-
tive discretion. And while tribal immunity is not subject to exec-
utive determinations in the same way that foreign nation immun-
ity had been before the FSIA, it is subject to a different branch’s 
control—the plenary powers of Congress. Like the Court’s defer-
ence to State Department rules, a deference to Congress’s refusal 
to restrict the comity that provides tribal immunity may be the 
most legally sound path. That being said, legal soundness is not 
the only consideration at stake; as seen in Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Souter’s opinions in City of Sherrill, the Court has treated 
the sovereign status of tribes as a so-called practical, rather than 
purely legal, matter. This Comment seeks to make the case that 
the legally sound path of broad tribal immunity, with deference 
to Congress to adjust, is also quite practical—it places tribes in 
control of their immediate destiny, while allowing Congress to 
legislate as it sees fit. 
E. Uncertainty Before Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
In County of Yakima, the Court justified the difference be-
tween the government’s inability to collect a tax on the sale of 
tribal land and the ability to collect a tax directly on the land itself 
with an in personam and in rem distinction.164 As the case was 
one of statutory interpretation, the Court derived its holding 
solely from a textualist analysis of the General Allotment Act.165 
Despite the limited nature of the case, this decision caused a state 
court and circuit court split to emerge on the broader issue of sov-
ereign immunity. Courts wrongly began using County of Yakima 
to provide a framework for analyzing tribal immunity in cases re-
garding land versus those merely involving land. Some jurisdic-
tions found immunity in both in rem and in personam cases, while 
others held that only in personam cases had such protection. Cer-
tain in rem actions are forbidden by law. For instance, one cannot 
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1632 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1605 
 
claim adverse possession against a reservation.166 But that tells 
us nothing about other in rem claims over real property and little 
about tribal immunity in claims against other tribal landhold-
ings. Lower courts, meanwhile, have been split. 
The Second Circuit differentiated between sovereign author-
ity and sovereign immunity, regardless of the type of land: “While 
the tax exemption of reservation land arises from a tribe’s exer-
cise of sovereignty over such land, and is therefore closely tied to 
the question of whether the specific parcel at issue is ‘Indian res-
ervation land,’ a tribe’s immunity from suit is independent of its 
lands.”167 Such a distinction meant that although the tribe could 
be taxed on the non-reservation land, the tribes were immune to 
foreclosure because the type of land matters not for immunity. 
Notably, this suit dealt with the same land as City of Sherrill, 
suggesting that immunity from suit may in fact be distinguished 
from equitable bars.168 A few years later, the same circuit “de-
cline[d] to draw the novel distinctions—such as a distinction be-
tween in rem and in personam proceedings” that it was asked to 
draw.169 In doing so, the circuit made clear that tribes have a 
“common-law [ ] immunity from suit—as opposed to immunity 
from other, largely prescriptive, powers of the states such as the 
levying of taxes.”170 
State courts, on the other hand, have been split on whether 
the type of action is relevant. The Supreme Court of New Mexico 
found “no meaningful distinction between in rem and in personam 
claims . . . [b]ecause tribal sovereign immunity divests a court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”171 A Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
panel saw the concern as a policy issue, arguing that “allowing in 
 
 166 See United States v 7,405.3 Acres of Land in Macon, Clay, and Swain Counties, 97 
F2d 417, 422 (4th Cir 1938): 
The determinative fact is that the federal government has assumed towards 
[this tribe] the same sort of guardianship that it exercises over other tribes of 
Indians, from which it results that their property becomes an instrumentality of 
that government for the accomplishment of a proper governmental purpose and 
may not be taken from them by contract, adverse possession, or otherwise, with-
out its consent. 
 167 Oneida Indian Nation of New York v Madison County, 605 F3d 149, 157 (2d Cir 
2010) (citation omitted), vacd and remd, 562 US 42 (2011). 
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rem claims against tribal property to proceed ‘would simply cir-
cumvent tribal sovereign immunity[,] allowing taking of tribal 
property’” and deeming this result to “be contrary to one of the 
primary purposes of sovereign immunity—protecting tribal treas-
uries.”172 In contrast, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed 
on policy grounds, noting that “[t]he Tribe has not cited any case 
holding that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem condem-
nation action in state court”173 before bemoaning the potentially 
“far-reaching effects on the eminent domain authority of states 
and all other political subdivisions” if the court were to grant im-
munity.174 The concern was that tribes could use their immunity 
from suit to “acquire veto power over any public works project at-
tempted by any state or local government merely by purchasing 
a small tract of land within the project.”175 
F. The Unresolved Case of Upper Skagit Indian Tribe 
This winding road led to Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, but the 
case resulted in three different opinions that only muddied the 
water. Unlike some cases previously discussed, the issue at hand 
involved not statutes or treaties but rather common law property 
principles. While the majority refused to offer a solution, the legal 
concerns from Justice Thomas’s dissent and the policy concerns 
from Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence must be consid-
ered when crafting a solution to the unanswered question of tribal 
immunity’s applicability to real property disputes. 
The case began when Sharline and Ray Lundgren filed a 
quiet-title action, invoking adverse possession against land re-
cently purchased by the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe. The tribe in 
turn claimed sovereign immunity as a defense.176 The Washington 
Supreme Court rejected the defense, citing to County of Yakima 
as ruling that “sovereign immunity does not apply to cases where 
a judge ‘exercises in rem jurisdiction’ to quiet title in a parcel of 
land owned by a Tribe, but only to cases where a judge seeks to 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Tribe itself.”177 The 
 
 172 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v Timber and Wood Products Located 
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Supreme Court held this to be in error but also remanded to the 
Washington Supreme Court to determine if immunity should ap-
ply.178 But the question remains unresolved: the Upper Skagit In-
dian Tribe quitclaimed the land to the Lundgrens before the case 
was taken back up.179 
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion is rife with judicial re-
straint and barren of guidance for lower courts. He dismissed the 
Washington Supreme Court’s analysis as “error,” determining 
that “Yakima did not address the scope of tribal sovereign im-
munity” but rather was a case solely devoted to determining the 
“tax consequences of [the] checkerboard” caused by allotment.180 
After a detailed discussion of County of Yakima, Justice Gorsuch 
avoided deciding the actual case before him. 
After the initial briefings, the Lundgrens changed their ap-
proach, and instead suggested the immovable property exception 
barred the tribe’s sovereign immunity claim, regardless of 
whether County of Yakima applied.181 The majority decided that 
the argument was introduced too late and preferred “the Wash-
ington Supreme Court to address these arguments in the first 
instance.”182 
Justice Thomas, however, embraced the immovable property 
exception. His dissent can be contrasted with Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion in City of Sherrill. She leaned heavily on practical re-
strictions of tribal sovereignty; Justice Thomas portrayed his 
opinion as grounded in a long history of legal theory. To him, the 
Court should have quickly “resolved this case based on the im-
movable-property exception to sovereign immunity,” which he 
claimed “plainly extend[ed] to tribal immunity, as it does to every 
other form of sovereign immunity.”183 But Justice Thomas did not 
cite a single case where the exception was applied to tribes. The 
only cases he discussed in detail were those dealing with foreign 
nation immunity. In doing so, he claimed the foreign nation cases 
warranted “deference to the political branches” due to their “sen-
sitive questions,” but that they “do not suggest that courts can 
ignore longstanding limits on sovereign immunity, such as the 
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immovable-property exception.”184 Likewise, to Justice Thomas, 
the Court has a “judicial duty” to determine the applicability of 
tribal immunity.185 This contorts the truth, however, that the 
Court has had a history of ignoring the immovable property ex-
ception in deferring to the executive branch.186 
The dissent reads like a historical dissertation. Justice 
Thomas cited treatises from the seventeenth century, restate-
ments from the twentieth century, and years of caselaw in be-
tween. He explained that this doctrine is a corollary to a conflict 
of laws doctrine know as lex rei sitae, which holds that the law of 
a land is governed by the law of whatever sovereign governs 
where the land is situated.187 He refuted the idea that sovereign 
immunity applies to in rem property disputes in US law, noting 
that “property ownership is not an inherently sovereign func-
tion”188 and Supreme Court precedent has “expressly 
acknowledge[d] the immovable-property exception.”189 
Justice Thomas argued that tribes have limited sovereignty, 
and only are afforded “the common-law immunity from suit tra-
ditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”190 While he had previ-
ously called into question the source and nature of tribal sover-
eignty,191 he seemed resigned to precedent in this decision. The 
common law immunity afforded to tribes is not greater than that 
afforded to other sovereigns, meaning that if any common law–
protected sovereigns are subject to the exception, then tribes 
must be too.192 He dismissed the argument that sovereignty of 
tribes “is not coextensive with that of the States”193 by saying that, 
even if true, this cannot mean that their sovereignty is “more ex-
pansive” than that claimed by the states—or the federal 
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government, for that matter.194 In so claiming, Justice Thomas 
completely ignored the fact that there are distinctions that do 
make tribal immunity broader than other forms of immunity—
such as the lack of implied waiver for tribes.195 
The conclusion derided tribal immunity, with Justice Thomas 
repeating the oft-stated expression that it “developed almost by 
accident” and claiming it “does not reflect the realities of modern-
day Indian tribes.”196 He invoked the Framers, noting that they 
“would be shocked to learn that an Indian tribe could acquire 
property in a State and then claim immunity from that State’s 
jurisdiction.”197 His thesis is simple: “The Government’s uncon-
vincing arguments cannot overcome more than six centuries of 
consensus on the validity of the immovable-property exception.”198 
But his six centuries of consensus was actually an ahistorical ac-
count of foreign nations—a qualifier he clearly did not assign to 
tribes. He can only point to treatises and theoretical applications 
of the exception to foreign state immunity in support of his claims; 
he ignores the history of the United States’ hesitation in applying 
the immovable property exception with those nations; and he con-
flates foreign-nation and tribal immunity, despite clear evidence 
that they have different scopes. 
In contrast to Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts joined 
the majority in full, but he wrote separately to express a distinct 
policy concern. His reasoning displays remarkable similarities to 
Justice Ginsburg’s practical concerns from City of Sherrill, while 
still showing sympathy to Justice Thomas’s legal argument. His 
concurrence focused on “[w]hat precisely [ ] someone in the 
Lundgrens’ position [is] supposed to do.”199 That is, tribes must be 
amenable to suit, “otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign immun-
ity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even without a 
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colorable claim of right.”200 He then critiqued the solutions pro-
posed by the tribe. 
The first suggested solution was that the parties engage in a 
bargain “toward a sensible settlement” after the Lundgrens admit 
to not being able to bring a suit against them.201 Chief Justice Rob-
erts dismissed this as “not a meaningful remedy,” but does not 
explain why.202 One could assume this to be akin to a holdout 
problem.203 “The Tribe bought the property with an eye to asking 
the federal government to take the land into trust and add it to 
the existing reservation next door” and discovered via a survey 
that the land was improperly tracked.204 The Lundgrens “pur-
chased their property long before the Tribe came into the picture,” 
but a recent survey revealed a boundary line dispute between 
their property and the tribe’s new purchase.205 The actual cost of 
settling this dispute could be massive, considering the Lundgrens 
had a strong desire to keep their land and the tribe had a strong 
desire to regain its land. Moreover, if the tribe were to have im-
munity from suit, it would have no incentive to bargain and could 
likely price out the Lundgrens, even if its own valuation was not 
that high. Government intervention may be necessary to mitigate 
costs.206 
The second solution was for the Lundgrens to provoke the 
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe into suing the couple and waiving its 
own immunity.207 Chief Justice Roberts, however, remained 
“skeptical that the law requires private individuals—who, again, 
had no prior dealings with the Tribe—to pick a fight in order to 
vindicate their interests.”208 
Chief Justice Roberts ended by saying the decision of the 
Court may be “intolerable.”209 He admitted that the immovable 
property exception is “a settled principle of international law,” 
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and that the only question this case presents “is whether different 
principles afford Indian tribes a broader immunity from actions 
involving off-reservation land.”210 Although content with leaving 
the question unanswered for now, he worried that if the state 
court does extend sovereign immunity to encompass “non-trust, 
non-reservation property,” then the doctrine would “need to be 
addressed in a future case.”211 
The legal implications of the dissent and the policy implica-
tions of the concurrence are no different than the concerns em-
bedded in tribal sovereignty more generally. Are courts to apply 
some corpus of defined legal rules to determine the scope of do-
mestic dependent nations? And if yes, which rules should be in 
the corpus? Should they be concerned with the policy implications 
at stake? This debate should help to resolve the indecision of Up-
per Skagit Indian Tribe. 
III.  THE NEARLY UNLIMITED SCOPE OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY 
Where can we find the answer to the “grave question?”212 
With the next in rem claim on tribal land, courts will only know 
that County of Yakima does not apply. This Comment argues 
tribes should retain immunity in all real property cases unless 
Congress has limited that right. Such a baseline withstands the 
relevant legal tests and is firmly grounded in the notion that 
tribes are simultaneously their own sovereigns and domestic de-
pendent nations subject to Congress’s control. With that baseline, 
however, comes the more radical claim: tribes should also never 
be considered subject to the immovable property exception, no 
matter the type of property in question. If both arguments are 
accepted, then the scope of tribal immunity in cases involving real 
property is currently unlimited, but subject to change by congres-
sional action. 
First, this Part explains why the question of the scope of 
tribal immunity should be considered absolute unless Congress 
intervenes. Second, it refutes the applicability of the immovable 
property exception. Third, it clarifies how this solution avoids the 
policy issues suggested by Chief Justice Roberts. 
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A. The Grave Answer: Deference to Congress 
Tribal sovereignty has had twists and turns, but the general 
trajectory can be described as toward treatment similar to that of 
other sovereigns, with the caveat that Congress may abrogate its 
protections at any time.213 Indeed, the Court has continuously 
found tribes have kept “their historic sovereign authority” absent 
congressional action.214 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, la-
ments that this precedential caveat “untenably hold[s] both posi-
tions” of tribal sovereignty and nonsovereignty.215 
The caveat, however, is not untenable. First, it is the funda-
mental meaning behind domestic dependent nation. Tribes are 
not part of the several states, so the Eleventh Amendment does 
not constitutionally protect their common law immunity.216 It can 
assuredly be taken from them at any moment. Tribes are not for-
eign nations, so the FSIA does not supplant whatever immunity 
they have retained. Second, the plenary power over the tribes’ im-
munity is not starkly different than the Court’s previous deferrals 
to executive branch determinations of who to hale into court pre-
FSIA. The executive branch consistently issued orders to grant 
absolute immunity to foreign nations, even when acting as pri-
vate parties through land acquisition or possession. It was due to 
the significant importance of foreign relations, as Justice Thomas 
notes, that such immunity persisted, rather than due to any 
judge-made rules. This deference-based rule existed in the back-
ground until an act of Congress altered it, rather than a shift in 
judicial opinion. Even when the State Department did not nego-
tiate with a particular country in a given suit, the court turned to 
State Department precedent. While the executive branch deals 
with foreign affairs, Congress did have authority to change the 
relationship. Meanwhile, Congress alone deals with Native na-
tions. Just as it had the ability to qualify the protections to foreign 
 
 213 Independent of Justice Thomas’s issues with this caveat, discussed below, Con-
gress’s ability to abrogate the immunity may just appear quite large at first glance. In 
actuality, however, it is analogous to Congress’s expansive powers to control the jurisdic-
tional limits of any lower federal court. See Henry M. Hart Jr, The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362, 
1365 (1953) (“Congress has plenary power to distribute jurisdiction among such inferior 
federal constitutional courts as it chooses to establish.”). 
 214 Michigan v Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US 782, 788 (2014). 
 215 United States v Lara, 541 US 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas concurring). 
 216 See note 42. 
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nations, Congress must have the ability to alter tribal immunity 
through its plenary control.217 
Indeed, the contrast of judicial versus legislative powers is 
clear when looking at the legal evolution of tribal immunity. Since 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, the Court has never lim-
ited a tribe from claiming it. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe was the first time anyone on the Court had 
suggested any exception to tribal immunity. The reason is simple: 
it is not the Court’s role to apply such an exception. In Kiowa 
Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc,218 the 
Court explicitly noted that it prefers to “defer to the role Congress 
may wish to exercise in this important judgment,” rather than 
decide for itself whether to limit tribal immunity.219 Justice 
Thomas suggested that the Court did recently refuse to extend 
immunity beyond the norms of the common law, but a decision 
not to extend is quite different than a decision to actively limit.220 
In the case he cited, the Court refused immunity for a tribal mem-
ber; but, of course, individual members of any sovereign do not 
have immunity unless acting on behalf of the sovereign.221 
Congress has, in fact, occasionally invoked its plenary powers 
over tribal immunity. It responded to Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma 
by considering “several bills to substantially modify tribal im-
munity” before adopting a “far more modest” bill that only applied 
to limited contract cases.222 And Congress has not only refrained 
from total abrogation of tribal immunity; it has expressly pre-
served tribal immunity on occasion.223 Justice Elena Kagan wrote 
that any judicial action that expresses an opinion restricting the 
scope of sovereign immunity “would scale the heights of presump-
tion” by “replac[ing] Congress’s considered judgment with our 
contrary opinion.”224 Indeed, the “rights that exist are not created 
by Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain 
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 218 523 US 751 (1998). 
 219 Id at 758. 
 220 See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 138 S Ct at 1661 (Thomas dissenting), citing Lewis 
v Clarke, 137 S Ct 1285, 1292 (2017). 
 221 See Lewis, 137 S Ct at 1291–93. 
 222 Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 801–02. 
 223 See, for example, 25 USC § 5332 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
. . . affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign immunity from 
suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe.”). 
 224 Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 US at 803. 
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limitations of power.”225 They are rights of sovereignty itself, and 
their source is found in an implied agreement by Congress’s inac-
tion.226 The very fact that Congress has so clearly invoked its lim-
iting abilities before suggests that extending beyond those invo-
cations would be a violation of this implied agreement. 
Finally, the federal government’s long history of subjugating 
tribal sovereignty and theft of tribal land greatly weigh in favor 
of a policy of deference. As both the trustee who should be acting 
in the best interests of the tribes and as a politically accountable 
unit, Congress should be forced to carry the burden of determin-
ing whether to restrict tribal immunity.227 It may rule to strip this 
broad immunity, but it is and should be within its power—not the 
courts’—to decide if that is best for tribes.228 
B. The Inapplicability of the Immovable Property Exception 
Since tribal immunity is absolute absent congressional ac-
tion, the only other exceptions that should prevent tribes from 
claiming it could be judge-made rules like the immovable prop-
erty exception. The exception only applies to land and property 
permanently attached to that land, so any discussion of whether 
the exception should apply must be analyzed through the lens of 
each type of tribal land. 
To start, reservation land should not be subject to the excep-
tion. First, it is not privately acquired by the tribe. It is estab-
lished by the United States and only diminishable by Congress. 
Second, the land is largely outside the jurisdiction of state law 
and subject to some federal regulations designed with self-
 
 225 Kawananakoa v Polyblank, 205 US 349, 353–54 (1907) (emphasis added). 
 226 See Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410, 416 (1979), citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 US 
at 136. 
 227 See Addison W. Bennett, Comment, Partially Tribal Land: The Case for Limiting 
State Eminent Domain Power under 25 USC § 357, 86 U Chi L Rev 945, 976 (2019) (argu-
ing that “[a]ny taking of Native American land by a state government requires a discussion 
of whether such a scheme would be in the interest of justice considering the history of 
tribal lands”). 
 228 In certain circumstances, such as in exercising its eminent domain powers, Con-
gress must choose whether it is acting as the fiduciary or the superior sovereign. To do so, 
the Court has adopted a test, in which it asks whether the government is making a good 
faith effort to exchange the tribal land for full value. See United States v Sioux Nation of 
Indians, 448 US 371, 408–09, 416 (1980), citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation v United States, 182 Ct Cl 543, 553 (1968). An applicable adaptation here 
would be whether Congress, by revoking tribal immunity in a real property suit, is making 
a good faith effort to ensure the tribe will maintain full value of the land. 
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government in mind.229 These two aspects allow reservation land 
to circumvent the immovable property exception. From the early 
explanations of the immovable property exception to today, the 
fundamental reasoning behind the exception is that “property 
ownership is not an inherently sovereign function.”230 The excep-
tion does not arise because of the sovereign itself, but because the 
sovereign has acquired land elsewhere—and engaged in private, 
rather than sovereign activity. As a result, reservation land is ob-
viously not under the exception. 
Land held in trust through 25 USC § 465 should also avoid 
the exception. The land is purchased by the secretary of the inte-
rior, and then transferred to be held in trust for the tribes. The 
dicta in City of Sherrill makes clear that the acquisition “provides 
the proper avenue for [tribes] to reestablish sovereign authority 
over territory.”231 With the reestablishment of sovereign authority 
comes “the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns” because 
such immunity was “passed to the United States for their bene-
fit.”232 In other words, the fiduciary relationship of the United 
States and the tribes mandates that the trust land be treated in 
the best interest of the tribes, which naturally preserves sover-
eignty and immunity. 
Finally, even land held in fee should not be considered subject 
to the exception. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in City of Sherrill 
only narrowly holds that equitable relief from ancient sovereignty 
claims can be barred by laches.233 Sovereign immunity is not a 
form of equitable relief, but a jurisdictional bar.234 Thus, while the 
dicta suggests sovereignty over certain land may be regained only 
 
 229 It could be argued that the land is occasionally subject to state control due to Pub-
lic Law 280. See 18 USC § 1162(a) (granting certain states jurisdiction over “offenses com-
mitted by or against Indians in [specified] areas of Indian country”). See also note 159; 
Nevada v Hicks, 533 US 353, 361–62 (2001) (“‘Ordinarily,’ it is now clear, ‘an Indian res-
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say that States may exert the same degree of regulatory authority within a reservation as 
they do without.” Id at 362. Indeed, Public Law 280 makes explicit some of the limitations: 
“Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any 
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trust by the United States.” 18 USC § 1162(b). 
 230 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193, 
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 232 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 309 US at 512. 
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through a 25 USC § 465 acquisition, the inverse that it is extin-
guished on fee land cannot necessarily be assumed.235 Rather, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that tribes retain immunity “even 
after dissolution of the tribal government,” implying traditional 
aspects associated with sovereignty need not always be present.236 
Even if true, the land is certainly a private purchase by a sov-
ereign—just the type of land acquisition to which the exception is 
meant to apply. The question would therefore be best solved by 
analogy. Should courts find tribes similar to states, thus enforcing 
the immovable property exception, or should they instead invoke 
foreign nations, and cede authority to a different branch? 
The Court has already alluded to an answer. Because “tribes 
were not at the Constitutional Convention,” the immunity from 
suit must be differentiated from state immunity, as the Conven-
tion is where the “mutuality of . . . concession” was contem-
plated.237 For foreign nation immunity, on the other hand, the 
“Court consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political 
branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on 
whether to take jurisdiction.”238 Such deferential decision-making 
is entirely in line with the way in which courts have treated tribes 
in recent years.239 The difference is that the State Department 
consistently gave orders to not bring foreign nations into domestic 
courts. Congress has not done so; but its silence in the face of 
other limitations on tribal immunity is unambiguous.240 Congress 
explicitly limited the scope of foreign nation immunity with the 
FSIA because of inconsistent judgments that resulted from vari-
ous State Department rules. Unless Congress disambiguates 
tribal immunity, as it has on occasion, then there is no reason to 
assume a tribe’s private actions should be subject to exceptions. 
 
 235 That being said, Justice Ginsburg herself would likely not read her decision in 
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C. Avoiding Tribal Immunity’s Sword 
If, as posited, Justice Thomas’s legal argument fails, then the 
question whether tribes retain immunity in cases involving real 
property must focus on policy, not law. A court should only find a 
way around permitting the application of immunity if it is de-
manded by an adequate, equitable solution, such as what Justice 
Ginsburg was apparently aiming for in her opinion in City of 
Sherrill. The courts have often weighed the tribe’s ability to pro-
tect its autonomy (and typically its treasury) against its ability to 
seize land at will and avoid suit. Situated within this balancing 
test is Chief Justice Roberts’s concern in Upper Skagit Indian 
Tribe; that is, that tribes would purchase land at will and then 
wield sovereign immunity like a sword. And while these concerns 
may be warranted, there is no clear reason to avoid applying sov-
ereign immunity only because of them. Once again, it is easiest to 
address the arguments for each type of land in turn. 
Chief Justice Roberts does not mention reservation land 
when voicing his concerns, perhaps because the facts of the case 
did not require it. Regardless, because Congress alone creates and 
diminishes reservations, there can be no apprehension of using 
sovereign immunity as a sword. Individual tribes may have lob-
bying power to try to acquire reservation land, but the absence of 
actual acquisitional power makes it functionally impossible for 
them to seize land at will solely to claim tribal immunity. 
Trust land is equally immune from these concerns. Tribes 
cannot seize land with impunity in hope of acquiring immunity 
from suit; instead, tribes can only request that the secretary of 
the interior purchase land into trust on their behalf. In the pro-
cess, they will know that the several factors discussed above must 
be considered if they wish to regain sovereignty.241 These guide-
lines prevent the very issues proposed by Chief Justice Roberts, 
while maintaining the social and economic benefits of tribal  
immunity. 
It may be argued that regardless of this governmental check, 
tribal immunity could actually hurt the tribes economically. Indi-
viduals and businesses may worry about being able to vindicate 
their rights if an overly broad protective rule is in place.242 That 
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is, people may be disincentivized from interacting with tribes if 
they do not know they can be compensated if they suffer a loss or 
injury. Inversely, if tribes were to have their immunity unilater-
ality limited by the government, they may be able to attract more 
social and economic interactions. But such an argument patron-
izingly ignores the fact that US courts are not the only remedial 
path; instead, litigants can find justice in equally viable tribal 
courts in which many tribes have already waived much of their 
immunity.243 Even if a tribe has not waived its immunity, it is dis-
ingenuous to say the tribe’s economic benefit is a fundamental 
part of tribal immunity, but then decide the tribe itself may not 
determine how to achieve that benefit.244 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts was explicitly worried about 
fee land. Many may agree with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Ginsburg that if tribes could simply snatch up new land and claim 
immunity, then there would be several “disruptive practical con-
sequences.”245 If a tribe were to purchase new land at market price 
and then claim immunity from suit, it could wield its immunity 
as a sword. But from a legal standpoint, the denial of immunity 
“is not only inequitable, but also irreconcilable with the principle 
that only Congress may abrogate or extinguish tribal sover-
eignty.”246 And from a policy standpoint, with Congress’s plenary 
powers over the tribes, Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns are some-
what fantastical. A mere piece of legislation can change this rule, 
as it has for foreign nations and tribes in the past; a judicial deci-
sion would be overreaching and irreconcilable with centuries of 
jurisprudence on tribal immunity. Until Congress creates “more 
predictable and precise rules,” the courts must abide by the foun-
dational law of sovereign immunity at its peak.247 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court hesitated to establish a standard for tribal immun-
ity for real property disputes—but its preference for passing the 
buck to another court, rather than creating a standard, should be 
condemned. The power to determine the scope of tribal immunity 
in US courts has always remained exclusively with Congress, and 
the Court should recognize this. With the recent confirmation in 
cases like Sharp v Murphy248 and McGirt v Oklahoma249 that sub-
stantial portions of Oklahoma have been part of Indian country 
for decades,250 a decision on in rem jurisdiction for tribal immun-
ity cases is needed sooner rather than later. Unless tribal immun-
ity is firmly established, the very nature of a tribe’s sovereignty—
not to mention its landholdings and possessory rights—will be 
constantly threatened. 
This Comment seeks to establish that tribal immunity in in 
rem actions is absolute and should remain so unless Congress 
acts. This immunity is subject to congressional regulation, but 
such a feature is inconsequentially distinct from foreign state im-
munity, where deference was given to the State Department until 
the legislative branch stripped them of that discretion. Further-
more, tribal land has never been subject to the immovable prop-
erty exception, and there is no clear policy reason for judges to 
suddenly change course. Any concerns over this scope are not for 
the courts to decide. That power starts and ends with the Native 
tribes and Congress. 
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